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Abstract—Domain names drive the ubiquitous use of
the Internet. Criminals and adversaries also use domain
names for their enterprise. Defenders compete to remove
or block such malicious domains. This is a complicated
space on the Internet to measure comprehensively, as the
malicious actors attempt to hide, the defenders do not
like to share data or methods, and what data is public
is not consistently formatted. This paper derives an ad
hoc model of this competition on large, decentralized
networks using a modification of Lanchester’s equations
for combat. The model is applied to what is known of the
current state of malicious domain activity on the Internet.
The model aligns with currently published research, and
provides a more comprehensive description of possible
strategies and limitations based on the general dynamics
of the model.
When taken with the economic realities and phys-
ical laws to which the Internet is bound, the model
demonstrates that the current approach to removing
malicious domain names is unsustainable and destined
for obsolescence. However, there are technical, policy, and
legal modifications to the current approach that would
be effective, such as preemptively populating watch lists,
limits on a registrant’s registrations, and international co-
operation. The results indicate that the defenders should
not expect to eliminate or significantly reduce malicious
domain name usage without employing new digital tactics
and deploying new rules in the physical world.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious domain names cause significant trouble
on the Internet, and defenders can and should resist
their damage. In deciding the best course of action in
eliminating malicious domain names from the Internet,
a model of the potential success of various approaches
would be a powerful tool. Lanchester’s equations model
military combat, but can be modified for this purpose.
Lanchester’s equations are themselves a modification
of the Lotka-Volterra equations, which model predator-
prey interaction. Lanchester’s equations have been crit-
ical to the modeling of warfare since their introduction
in 1916 [1].
The idealized conception of the equations has many
assumptions and they have been modified many times
using various assumptions to better accommodate var-
ious types of warfare, such as by [2, 3, 4]. Following
[3], the basic combat interaction between a red force R
and a blue force B over time, the Lanchester equations
are:
dr/dt = −Kbb(t); r(0) = R0
db/dt = −Krr(t); b(0) = B0 (1)
Here, Kb and Kr are non-negative scalars represent-
ing the effectiveness of the two forces against each
other. The number of active blue soldiers (or airplanes,
tanks, etc.), b, in the battle will decrease proportional to
the number of soldiers with which red, r, is opposing
blue. The number of units changes as a function of
time over the duration of the battle. The larger initial
force will win, if Kb and Kr are equal. However, if R0
were twice B0, blue could try to compensate by being
more effective at destroying red, i.e. increase Kb. But to
overcome this 2:1 disadvantage in numbers, Kb would
have to be 4 times more effective than Kr. That is, the
basic Lanchester equations are second order.
In a military conflict in which both unit types have
the same destructive effectiveness, the side with a
numerical advantage will have significantly fewer total
casualties by the end of the conflict. The effect is
demonstrated in the following contrived examples. The
Spartans, with superior numbers, achieve a lopsided
victory just by maintaining parity with the destructive
effectiveness of the smaller force (Figure 1). In order to
overcome the Spartans superior numbers, the Athenians
must be 4 times more effective to battle them to a draw
(Figure 2).
There are many modifications of the Lanchester
models. For example, the equations can be modified
to take in to account heterogeneous forces (riflemen,
infantry, tanks, etc. on each side) each with a different
success rate against each type of enemy unit. This can
be accommodated by constructing matrices analogous
to (1) [2].
Lanchester’s basic equations are derived from the
Lotka-Volterra model of predator and prey. Lanchester
removed elements that accounted for the birth of prey
and the natural death of predators. This is sensible,
2Figure 1. Contrived example in which the Spartans have double the
initial force and same destructiveness.
Figure 2. Contrived example in which the Spartans have double
initial force but the Athenians have 4-times their destructive effec-
tiveness.
as the time scale of battles does not allow for the
production of new soldiers during the battle. The basic
predator-prey equations incorporate this concept as
follows, where y is the number of predators and x is







Here, the terms x(t) and y(t) are abbreviated as x and
y, respectively. This convention will continue for future
variables which are a function of time. The symbols
A, B, C, and D are non-negative scalars. The terms A
and C account for the birthrate of prey and the natural
death rate of predators, respectively. The terms B and D
account for the rate at which the predators kill prey and
use that energy to reproduce, respectively. Birthrates
make (2) conceptually different from (1), as does the
concept of consumption for reproduction.
Yet like (1), the Lotka-Volterra equations model
entities that both destroy and are destroyed. This is
not true of domain names. Therefore equations to
model domain dynamics modify both the Lanchester
and Lotka-Volterra equations significantly, while still
taking their inspiration from the earlier equations.
II. EXISTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
There are observations about the current dynamics of
the digital environment and past work that empirically
support the design of this model. This evidence is
difficult to assemble because there is no agreed-upon
reporting format or venue for domain name abuse.
Furthermore, data may be considered proprietary or
sensitive. However, in the author’s experience, the
available evidence supports the model as proposed in
Section III. Malicious actors can and do automate fixed
costs, externalize fixed costs, reduce variable costs,
and utilize existent infrastructure. These are generally
economically sensible actions [6], and malicious actors
can intelligently follow them the same as everyone else
[7].
Some of the larger respites from malicious activity
have been not due to defensive action, but due to
the decisions of the attackers. The group of malicious
actors known as Avalanche abandoned their phishing
exploits on their own, although presumably to pursue
other endeavors [8]. The APWG phishing reports have
not measured a large decrease in phishing attacks
besides this purposeful abandonment over several years
of measurement [9, 10, 8, 11, 12].
Malicious actors’ activities can be modeled as having
a negative marginal cost and low variable cost due to
the dynamics of digital economics. Additionally, many
initial costs are borne by other organizations, such as
registrars, who sell domain name services. Initial costs
may also be borne by previous criminals, who have
gone through the trouble to establish botnets usable
as name servers or other services. This infrastructure
further reduces set up costs, i.e. E in (5). Several large
botnets tend to exist at any given time [13].
In practice, the cost of domain names to malicious
actors is nearly zero. Dozens of dynamic DNS services
provide free domain name registration. Furthermore,
many registrars and registries permit “domain tasting,”
in which a registrant is permitted to use a domain
for a few days to get a sense of the traffic available
to it before paying. Even though ICANN successfully
implemented policies to eliminate this practice within
generic TLDs, the country code TLDs aren’t bound
by the same policies [14]. The useful lifetime of a
malicious domain is already below a few days [15].
So the attack patterns are already adapted to making
use of a domain well within the time frame afforded
by this free domain tasting.
There are other factors that make domains free.
Much malicious content is served from hacked servers
on hacked IPs or domains. In late 2007 to early
2008, about 75% of phishing domains were hosted on
hacked, and re-hacked, servers [16]. Two years later,
the rate was independently estimated to be at least
385% of phishing domains hosted on existing domains
[17]. The rate of hosting on compromised services is
important, because it is nearly impossible to proactively
predict what will be hacked. The technical response is
therefore pinned in many cases to a reactive approach,
however we will demonstrate that a reactive approach
has significant short-comings.
Significant efforts have also been made in measuring
the economic cost of cybercrime [18]. This is a difficult
multi-disciplinary task, and there is still more work to
be done. [18] also importantly differentiates between
direct and indirect losses to the defenders. The attackers
can only monetize a percentage of the direct losses,
even though indirect losses are often much larger.
However, existing global direct losses are estimated
to be on the order of a billion dollars, give or take
an order of magnitude. There is also evidence that
targeting physical infrastructure, such as banks, can
have a significant impact on criminal behavior, regards
rogue pharmacies [19].
III. MODELING DOMAIN NAME TAKE-DOWN
The equations introduced can be modified to suitably
describe actors competing in the digital world, given
the appropriate assumptions are extracted from (1) and
(2). For example, the assumption that every ranged unit
can target every enemy ranged unit is not physically
feasible for a large force. On the Internet, however, this
is reasonable. In usual day to day operations, every part
of the Internet is supposed to be reachable by every
other part of the Internet [20, p. 22]. In this regard,
the basic Lanchester equation format should apply to
competition interactions that occur over the Internet.
The competition of domain name take-down is quite
different from that of armed combat. Notably, the
entities being destroyed are not the entities doing
the destruction. This exception essentially violates the
assumptions that entities in x and y are commensurate.
Additionally, the competition is inherently one-sided.
This is more similar to a predator-prey relationship than
an armed conflict. The malicious domains do not seek
to take down benign domains, but to steal informa-
tion (intellectual property, personal information, credit
cards) and resources (money, CPU time for botnets)
from the target. For this reason, malicious domain
activity or numbers do not directly affect malicious
actors’ opponents, even though a competition for re-
sources may have indirect effects.
Like prey, which are born and die during the scope
of the competition described by the above equations,
domain names are definitely registered and taken down
during the competition. On the other hand, digital
competition contains asymmetries unlike either war or
predation. These asymmetries complicate the connected
equations necessary to describe the competition. The
following variables are proposed to represent the salient
aspects of the competition interaction among domain
names, regardless of their particular malicious use.
Variables that are a function of time:
xδ :=number of active malicious domains
xν :=number of malicious domains newly registered
during the interval that have not been ac-
tivated
xm :=resources (either in time, person-hours, or
money) malicious actors have available for
registering and maintaining domain names
xc :=resources lost by malicious actors due to
non-technical socio-political and criminal
penalties.
ym :=resources the community or organization makes
available to defensive actions, such as tak-
ing down or blocking malicious domains.
yr :=resources (time, person-hours, money, intelli-
gence, intellectual property, etc.) lost by
the community or organization as a result
of fraud, etc., enabled by malicious do-
mains.
Scalars that represent effectiveness or efficiency:
D∼ := various; convert units of variable to domain
units; must be ≥ 0.
C∼ := various; converts units of variable to mon-
etary units; must be ≥ 0.
Values which are modeled as constants:
N := rate at which new domains are registered
by malicious actors
E := engineering and development costs.
With these parameters, we can propose several equa-
tions following the spirit of the Lanchester and Lotka-
Volterra algorithms. Variables in x represent aspects of




= Dxmxm+(Dxν xν)− (Dymym) (3)
dxν
dt
=−Dxν xν − (Dm2ym)+N (4)
dxm
dt







Equation (3) models the rate of change of the pop-
ulation of active malicious domains. The scalar Dym
4represents the effectiveness of take-down measures per
unit of resources devoted. It is estimable by observa-
tion, in principle. Block listing has been observed to
be reasonably effective [21]. The scalar Dxm represents
the effectiveness of efforts to maintain active malicious
names and their infrastructure. Since not all newly-
registered domains are activated right away, some per-
centage of the registered domains will be activated
over time, which is represented by Dxν . Measurements
would be necessary to determine this percentage and if
it is constant. Studies to this effect are not known, so
for the time being it will be approximated as such.
To balance the equations, they must use the same
units. The units of xm and ym (resources) are not
commensurable with those of xδ and xν (domains).
However, the important aspect of the equation is that
efforts to take down the malicious domains are offset
by both efforts to keep them alive and the number
of new domains that are activated. The units of Dym ,
Dxm , etc., could simply be such that they convert
units appropriately. This would not change the general
dynamics of the equation. Similar conversions will be
assumed for all the equations.
Equation (4) models the change in the number of
registered but inactive domains. Since xν represents
domains that have been registered, but not used, it
is decremented by the number of domains that are
activated in (3). For simplicity, domains are modeled
to be registered at a rate independent of the other
variables by the scalar N. Community take-down efforts
could also reduce these domains, but with a different
effectiveness coefficient than these efforts effect live
malicious domains in (3).
Equation (5) models the resources available to the
malicious actors. The scalar Cyr describes a percentage
of those resources stolen that can be incorporated
into the malicious actors’ resources. Scalars Cδ2 and
Cxν essentially represent the cost of maintaining and
registering a domain name, respectively. The scalar E
is a cost independent of the number of domain names
active. It represents various engineering, setup, human,
and organizational costs.
The resources available to the defender must con-
strain the defensive resources allocated, ym. Resources
allocated to defense are related to resources lost be-
cause it is natural to devote more resources to a
bigger problem. However, in practice there are many
social, political, and economic factors that alter what
resources are allocated for network defense, and such
non-technical features are not modeled in (6). The lack
of non-technical aspects would be most important to
the model in (6), so here this modeling choice is most
acutely felt.
In principle, the defender’s losses may be reduced
by legal action or insurance payments, however these
recuperations will not, for the community as a whole,
exceed the costs of providing them. For example,
any insurance provider will have to charge more for
premiums than they give out, or else that provider
will become insolvent. Given losses of this nature it is
sensible to assume that yr is monotonically increasing,
as in (7).
The change is positive in (7) because it represents
increasing losses, rather than decreasing resources. The
variable yr is also presumed to have no limit in (7). So
far, fraud losses have not been so great as to overwhelm
the economy or resources of whole communities or
organizations, but there is certainly some threshold that
yr could reach for which the defrauded entity would
cease to be able to function. Such catastrophes are not
considered in this model.
The starting resources available to malicious actors
are non-zero, since there are certainly some initial
resources rolled over from previous crime, digital or
not. This starting funding is the value of xm at t = 0.
Evaluating the values of the initial conditions is diffi-
cult, but for each variable it is greater than zero.
In theory, there are five costs to model in (5). In
reality, for international cybercrime at least, Cxc is
essentially zero.1 This is because there are few effective




=Cy2yr− (Cδ2xδ )− (Cxν xν)−E (8)
From these differential equations relationships be-
tween the resources expended by malicious actors and
the community can be derived. Malicious actors will
gain resources and capabilities, i.e. dxmdt will be greater
than zero, as long as the following inequality holds:
Cy2yr >Cδ2xδ +Cxν xν +E (9)
That is, if their profits exceed their expenditures.
Furthermore, if the number of active malicious domains
is to decrease, i.e. dxδdt in (3) is negative, then the
following must hold:
1There are no international treaties to account for international
cybercrime. The bilateral treaties that exist are avoided by the
criminals. INTERPOL cannot press charges, and so the lack of
international agreement on what constitutes a crime renders the
organization ineffective in this arena. The International Criminal
Court (ICC) has not been approved by sufficient nations to be
considered effective, especially lacking the support of the United
States. The main purpose of the ICC is also war crimes, not cyber
crimes, and so would require a significant increase in scope before
it would be helpful to this particular problem. As such, the term
for criminal penalties and costs is effectively zero. Implementing
effective international criminal penalties is a necessary long-term
solution.
5Dymym > Dxmxm+Dxν xν (10)
The costs represented by xm and Cxν are essentially
the variable costs of a domain name to the malicious
actor. Variable costs are opposed to fixed costs, which
are initial investments. Total costs are variable costs
plus fixed costs. Marginal cost is the change in total
cost per one more unit of output, i.e. one more domain
[6, p 84ff]. In an unconstrained digital economy, repro-
duction is reduced to copying patterns of bits, which
has a variable cost of essentially zero. As more units
are produced, initial fixed costs are averaged out over
more units produced and so marginal cost is negative
and production costs asymptote towards the cost of a
new unit. Therefore, unopposed, domains will approach
being free to the malicious actor.
IV. OBSERVED CURRENT DYNAMICS
The equations proposed are difficult to measure.
This difficulty is not purely technical, but also due
to interests protected by various actors and defenders.
Sharing information is still difficult. Therefore, the
current proposal is based on a large corpus of anecdotal
evidence and reasoning, in addition to the above em-
pirical support. These data points suggest the following
constraints on the proposed equations. The proposed
constraints lead to useful conclusions in understanding
how the actions available to the network defense com-
munity are circumscribed, and the following section
discusses how those constraints can be overcome to
improve network defense.
Both take down resistance and activation of do-
mains are actions that can be automated. Automation
increases Dxm and Dxν , which is not beneficial for the
defender, considering (10). Automation converts these
activities into variable costs, rather than fixed costs.
The engineering to automate the operations is the fixed
cost. Attackers reduce E in (5) in this way, thereby
increasing their profits. Digital, automated costs to the
malicious actor will approach the cost of copying bits,
i.e. zero, unless non-digital costs are imposed by the
defenders. In a purely digital competition, the number
of domains available to the malicious actor should
always exceed the defender’s ability to take them down;
the variable cost of detecting domains is not zero.
Increasing digital costs is an important and necessary
defense, but it is not a sufficient defense.
One might expect there to be switching costs in-
volved in new domain names, i.e. that Cxν would
incorporate some component of a switching cost for
each new domain. However this is not clear. Since the
DNS is one ubiquitous protocol designed to minimize
switching costs, the costs are low as long as the mali-
cious code is capable of asking for the correct names.
This engineering is non-trivial, but not actually related
to the domain names themselves. Further, malicious
code has demonstrated the ability to incorporate both
updates and outside data [22], and so the process of
what names to look up is also able to be automated,
thus providing an avenue to significantly reduce cost.
If the malicious actor would actually purchase the
domain, the cost of the domains could be charged to
fraudulent or stolen credit cards, perhaps those obtained
by previous attacks. Even if stolen credit cards are
purchased the cost is minimal. The market for credit
card credentials is flooded — price is based on the
availability of processing time, not on the supply of
stolen credentials.2 It is reasonable to imagine that
some registrars are established by malicious actors for
easier dealing in such stolen credentials. Such mali-
cious establishments have been repeatedly observed for
other functions on the Internet, such as the infamous
Russian Business Network and many others [23]. This
behavior also follows a digital information economy.
However the fixed costs of establishing such a business
are non-digital, and therefore a potentially useful target
for defensive actions.
Given this rationale, it is reasonable to estimate
values for Cδ2 and Cxν in (5), (8) and (9); the cost
of maintaining a DNS structure and registering new
domain names each are near zero and getting nearer.
The cost of engineering these solutions, E, is also
slowly approaching zero as code is reused and existing
infrastructure is leveraged. In this purely digital com-
petition, the terms xδ and xν effectively drop out of
(8). It then simplifies to a depressing expression about




Equation (11) states that the resources of the ma-
licious actors will only increase in a purely digital
competition with the defenders. Additionally, as long as
malicious actors control malicious domains yr should
increase as per (9), and so the malicious actors’ profits
will increase ever faster.
Certain environments may implement defenses, such
as a whitelist in the web proxy on what sites em-
ployees can visit, that resist the state of affairs that
Equation (11) describes. This would increase the cost to
malicious actors to attack that organization. However,
such policies are not presently feasible on the Internet
2This information is based on anecdotal evidence from an expert,
and has yet to be codified. There are probably additional factors
influencing the low cost in addition to large supply, such as lack of
trust between purveyors.
6at large, and it is not clear that such policies are
conceptually feasible at such scale. Thus organizations
that connect to the Internet must contend with the
reality that Equation (11) describes a feature of the
present Internet.
V. RAMIFICATIONS
These models make certain statements. From (9)
one can surmise that a defensive tactic is to make
xν have to be very high to increase the cost to the
malicious actor. A defender could do so by taking
down many domains, forcing many new ones to be
registered. The take-down rate is (hopefully) increased
by community expenditures, i.e. ym, as scaled by Dym
in (3). Equation (10) permits a simple evaluation of the
success of community expenditures based on whether
they take down more domains than the malicious actors
can maintain and activate.
Equation (10) also demonstrates that community
take-down efforts could be resisted if adversaries cre-
ate domain structures more resilient to take-down or
register and activate many new domains. In practice,
both tactics are used.3 In light of the dynamics of
the Lanchester equations, the defender would seem to
have an advantage. If defender resources, y, are much
larger than adversary resources, x, then x would have
to compensate by a geometric advantage in Dxm (3)
and Cxν (5). Therefore defense should be tenable for
the defender if Dxm and Cxν are relatively close in
value to Dym (3). In the physical world it is nearly
assured that large, technologically-advanced forces will
not be grossly out-gunned by ragtag criminals. Yet, the
economics of digital information change the landscape
significantly.
It is clear from (10) and (11) and the realities in Sec-
tion II that an approach which attempts to limit criminal
activity solely by removing domains used maliciously
is ill-fated. Even if the lifetime of a malicious domain
were forced towards its cost of production, i.e. zero, any
reactive approach cannot actually eliminate the domain
before its use. Therefore, reactive block list services
alone4 cannot reduce the domain lifetime to its cost,
no matter how efficient or well-conceived. In order to
react, the domain must have been used, which means
profit can be generated in that one use on something
that was free to obtain. To reduce the domain lifetime to
less than one use, a domain-name-based block list must
3For example, the Conficker C virus generated 50,000 new random
domains per day, and each infected host would attempt to contact a
pseudo-random selection of 500 of these. This randomness is time
and effort in algorithm design, i.e. increased xm, and the high domain
volume is a large xν .
4Block lists currently in use (McAfee RBL, Spamhaus, PhishTank,
Google safe browsing, etc.) and receiving academic acclaim (EXPO-
SURE [24], Notos [25], Kopis [26]) are reactive.
be predictive, i.e. remove domains before they are used.
This ability to eliminate registered domains before they
are activated is modeled in (4) by the term Dm2ym. In
the current landscape, Dm2 is essentially equal to zero.5
A predictive block list could force the average do-
main lifetime below one use, since some lifetimes
would be zero. There are some examples of such a
predictive method. One utilizes intelligence from TLD
zone files [27], and another uses simply the URL itself
without fetching the content [28, 29]. Even though
these explore a useful direction, the false positive rate
as proposed is too high to be used in production. Some
of the URL detection methods have low false positive
rates, yet when considered in the context of the base
rate fallacy the rates may still be too high [30, ch 9A].
This makes them a useful tool, but prevents existing
technology from completely solving this problem.
Defenders should refine such predictive approaches.
Reactive blocking fails because the revenue derived
from malicious domains, Cδ1xδ (7), will exceed the
cost of new domains, Cxν xν (5). The value derived from
activated domains is small, but it only needs to exceed
a minuscule cost. A predictive block list would institute
a non-zero Dm2 scalar in (4), and alter the landscape
significantly by preventing some xν from becoming
xδ . However it is not a complete fix. Compromised
domains and services frustrate a predictive list because
malicious activity hosted on newly compromised re-
sources cannot be predicted as easily. However all are
not completely defeated. Some methods, such as the
URL prediction methods mentioned above, would be
able to detect URLs on compromised servers, although
what degradation, if any, would be present in that case
is not explicitly tested in the papers.
Another defensive option would be to implement
policies or actions that would increase the switching
or registration costs, including time, for domain names.
There are currently no realistic barriers to registering
tens of thousands of domain names and maintain-
ing them indefinitely, to be activated when necessary.
While most second-level domains cost legitimate reg-
istrants money, the criminals do not have to use this
method. The model reflects this state in that Cδ2, the
cost of maintaining domain names in (5), is effectively
zero. A poorly resourced attacker may have to actually
purchase domains. However an established attacker
may use compromised domains and machines. In this
case, the resources are stolen and the attacker does not
maintain them except to retain illicit access. Different
coefficient values could be supplied for different types
5In the case of Conficker the community made a concerted effort to
block domains before they were used. Conficker variant C eventually
overwhelmed these efforts. There has been little effort to work on
this in the general case.
7of attackers, however this refinement is left as future
work.
Investigation of registration activity would have
precedent. Banks investigate suspicious withdrawals
or deposits of large amounts of cash [31, p. 88-89].
Similarly, registrars and registries would be justified
in investigating such anomalous behavior; there is
evidence that malicious domains behave differently in
the data they handle [32]. Following the example of
banking anomaly detection, it is possible to be fruitful
without hampering daily users. Simply capping batch
registrations at a low number would be a start. However
the community would have to decide on a cap as
a collective policy decision, because some registrars
base their business around processing bulk registrations
cheaply and one does not expect that they would
willingly give up that business model. This resistance
makes a concrete model such as this one a necessary
tool for motivating the appropriate policy. Coordination
from registrars and registries would make it more
difficult to register a domain (Cxν ), to maintain it (Cxδ ),
and increase defenders’ ability to take down both active
(Dym ) and registered but unused (Dm2) names.
In order to increase the terms Cxcxc and E in Equa-
tion 5 (thus decreasing the malicious actors’ profit),
pressure could be applied in a couple places. One
point would be on registrars. Certainly, some registrars
do a better or worse job at preventing abuse than
others. Establishing or finding an efficient registrar is
a kind of engineering cost (E) for the attackers. If
such statistics were available to the community, if not
publicly, pressure could be applied to those registrars
to improve. Offending registrars should eventually lose
their authority to register names. Without any such
censure process in place, there is no way to prevent
rogue registrars from aiding and abetting the criminals.
Other brick-and-mortar institutions that serve to abet
cyber criminals should also be sought out and censured
or terminated. The criminal process is not an exclu-
sively digital phenomenon, and traditional countermea-
sures must not be abandoned. For example, services
that launder money (such as banks) would be a valuable
target. Such institutions have much higher costs, both
to replace, switch, and operate, than simple domain
names, also increasing the cost of E. Finding, arresting,
and incarcerating the criminals would be a deterrent.
The models in Section III and the realities in Section
II demonstrate that cyber crime cannot be effectively
combated by digital means alone. Yet due to ineffective
international coordination, current approaches to the
problem are almost exclusively digital. This approach
is not sustainable. Effective political changes need to
occur to make criminal penalties for international cyber
crime a reality; that is, increase Cxcxc.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The most important piece of future work would
be to conduct computer simulations of the proposed
equations and test out various system dynamics. While
the above analytic solution is intuitive and agrees with
existing anecdotal evidence, simulation would help
drive strategic decisions.
Another important aspect to explore is the values
for the variables at the initial conditions. Estimates
of some may exist, but there is significant room for
improvement. Another possible area for exploration
could incorporate the interaction of multiple types of
forces within each competing entity, as Dolansky does
for Lanchester’s original equations [2]. Incorporating
such heterogeneity may prove useful in the discussion
of domain name take down and competition as well.
Each take-down technique will almost certainly have
varying effectiveness on the various deployments of
malicious domains. Additionally, these models may
generalize to other types of network behavior. That
determination will have to be made for several large
classes of network behavior independently.
In regards to (7), while money may be recouped by
the defrauded in a legal case, there is still increasing
cost to the community in general in order to pay for the
police, insurance, and legal activities. This paper does
not introduce such players into the model, and such
inputs are left to future work. Such additions would
likely be an extension of introducing heterogeneity into
the model. There is also some point at which a critical
point is reached and the defender begins to collapse due
to resources lost. To model this a bounded formula for
the elements of (7) could be implemented.
Equation (6) is recognized to be incomplete. This
equation oversimplifies the rate at which the defender’s
resources change. While defensive resources are cer-
tainly diminished by resources lost to the attacker, there
are myriad other influences. These include resources
allocated due to social pressure, legal requirements,
ideological values, and others. It is also probable that a
community’s sense of urgency could increase defensive
resources related to the number of malicious domains
(xδ ), which would further complicate the interaction.
Modeling such interactions is left for future work.
Equation (4) is also incomplete. The rate at which
new domains are made available to the malicious actor
is not constant, so the dynamics of N must also be
modeled. The process is probably related to the agent’s
needs, opportunities, available resources, and other
chance factors. The scalar E in (5) is similarly over-
simplified, and would benefit from a more thorough
analysis.
Identifying actual resources available to malicious
actors is another realm of study. This empirical work is
8ongoing in certain niches, such as the spam economy
[33]. In general, specifying the values of the scalars
in the equations and the initial funding and existing
malicious domains is future work for empirical study.
Section V recommends identifying and removing
rogue registrars. Successfully doing so would not end
the competition, but would likely push the battle to
dynamic DNS services. Such services provide free
domain names, name server access, and services for
user-defined subdomains under domains that the dy-
namic DNS service provider controls. Essentially, they
serve as an informal registrar, registry, and name server
operator. Dynamic DNS services could be considered
rogue registrars which would require censure; however
they do not operate under the authority of ICANN or
another central authority and so would be more difficult
to find and censure.
It also seems that these dynamics also apply to
other areas of cyber security. Spam, compromised user
accounts, anti-virus signatures, and software vulnera-
bilities all may fit this dynamical model, although with
different scalar values which are probably not nearly
zero in the same places. This similarity should be
researched, as if this model generalizes to most cyber
security problems on the Internet, it would be more
useful than just malicious domain names.
VII. CONCLUSION
Digital countermeasures to malicious domains are
still necessary. Their effectiveness has been docu-
mented. However, as the competition continues, the
malicious actors will continue to adapt around digital
countermeasures. The models presented demonstrate
that malicious actors should be expected to always be
able to adapt around digital countermeasures and still
profit. Given the necessary features of a digital econ-
omy and reactive blocking, the malicious actors will
still have revenues exceeding their costs. These digital
methods must be accompanied by physical and policy
countermeasures to cyber crime and malicious domain
name usage. Malicious domains serve as a means to
a human economic end. Criminals will operate in the
space where they will not be caught or punished. With-
out effective penalties equivalent to those for traditional
crime, one cannot expect cyber crime to cease of its
own accord or by digital countermeasures alone.
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